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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated Sections 78-2-2(4) (Supp. 1995), and 78-2a-3(2)(k)
(Supp. 1995).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court properly refuse to terminate

appellee's right to alimony based on the "residency" requirement
of Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(6) and the "cohabitation"
clause of the Decree of Divorce?
This issue is a mixed question of fact and law.
v. Haddow. 707 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 1985).

Haddow

Appellate courts give

great deference to the trial court's finding of fact in divorce
cases and do not overturn them unless they are clearly erroneous.
Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah App. 1993); see also
Barber v. Barber, 792 P.2d 134, 136 (Utah App. 1990)(trial
court's termination of temporary alimony affirmed on appeal
because appellant failed to marshal relevant evidence and failed
to show trial court's findings of fact to be clearly erroneous).
Conclusions of law arising from factual findings are to be
reviewed for correctness, and are given no special deference on
appeal.

Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah App.

1994); see also. Judge Norman H. Jackson, Utah Standards of
Appellate Review, Utah Bar Journal, October 1994, at 24-27.
2.

Should this Court award appellee's costs and

attorneys fees on appeal?
This question does not involve issues raised at the
trial level, and therefore there is no applicable standard of
appellate review.

If a trial court's order is affirmed on

appeal, "costs shall be taxed against appellant unless otherwise
2

ordered.H

Rule 34(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (1995).

Moreover, attorney fees on appeal may be granted in the
discretion of the court in conformance with statute or rule.
Mauahan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 162 (Utah App. 1989)(citing
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1984)).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-3(1) (1995) states:
In any action filed under Title 30,
chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action to
establish an order of custody, visitation,
child support, alimony, or division of
property in a domestic case, the court may
order a party to pay the costs, attorney
fees, and witness fees, including expert
witness fees, of the other party to enable
the other party to prosecute or defend the
action. The order may include provision for
costs of the action.
Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-5(6) (1989) states:
Any order of the court that a party pay
alimony to a former spouse terminates upon
establishment by the party paying alimony
that the former spouse is residing with a
person of the opposite sex. However, if it is
further established by the person receiving
alimony that that relationship or association
is without any sexual contact, payment of
alimony shall resume.
Rule 34(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (1995)
states:
Except as otherwise provided by law, if
an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be taxed
against the appellant unless otherwise agreed
by the parties or ordered by the court; if a
judgment or order is affirmed, costs shall be
3

taxed against appellant unless otherwise
ordered; . . . .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Nature of the Case

This appeal involves whether or not Appellant Robert L.
Pendleton ("Appellant") is entitled to a termination of alimony
payments to his former wife, Appellee Joyce A. Pendleton
("Appellee").

Appellant filed his Petition for Termination of

Alimony ("Petition") with the trial court on October 26, 1993.
(R. 233) . Appellee filed her Answer to Petition for Termination
of Alimony on January 19, 1994.

(R. 247). The Honorable Judge

Kenneth Rigtrup conducted a bench trial of the relevant issues on
January 27, 1995.

(R. 347). Although Judge Rigtrup discussed

his findings from the bench (R. 445-50), he subsequently entered
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 281-85) and an Order
dismissing Appellant's Petition for Termination of Alimony
without prejudice.

(R. 286-87).

Judge Rigtrup concluded that

the residency requirement under Utah Code Annotated Section 30-35(6) contemplates more than just sexual relations, and requires
some "duration, continuity, [and] some commitment to a shared,
beneficial relationship."
B.

(R. 284, Conclusions of Law f^[ 4, 6).

Statement of Facts

The material facts in this case are generally not
disputed.

With the exception of some minor factual statements
4

made by Appellant for which there is no citation to the record,
or the record citation does not support, Appellee generally
accepts the "Statement of Facts" section contained on pages 5-9
of Appellant's brief.

For clarification and further development,

Appellee sets forth the following facts, many of which have been
completely ignored by Appellant.
Appellant and Appellee were divorced on March 5, 1991.
Paragraph 13 of the Decree of divorce states as follows regarding
alimony:
The plaintiff [Appellee] shall be awarded
permanent alimony of Four Hundred and no/100
Dollars ($400.00) a month. The defendant is
ordered to pay alimony until the death of the
plaintiff, the remarriage of the plaintiff,
cohabitation of the plaintiff, or further
order of this Court.
(R. 176-77)(emphasis added).
At trial, Appellant testified that he first became
aware, in August of 1993, that Appellee had entered into a
relationship with Bill Hunter ("Hunter").

(R. 431 L22-24).

Based on suspected cohabitation, Appellant filed a Petition for
Termination of Alimony in October 1993, ceased making alimony
payments to Appellee, and began depositing said payments into a
holding account.

(R. 281-82, Findings of Fact ff 1-2).

Appellee and Hunter commenced an eight-month sexual
relationship in July of 1993 which continued through February of
1994, during which time they spent most of their free time
together.

(R. 282, Findings of Fact ff 3, 5; R. 354 L12-25; R.
5

355 L18-22).

Following a hiatus in their relationship, from

August of 1994 through January of 1995, they established a fairly
consistent pattern of sexual relations.

(Id. }[ 4; R. 401 L3-5) .

The trial court made the following additional findings
of fact:
6*
During that eight-month period, Mr.
Hunter and Ms. Pendleton ate a few meals
together and shared some expenses; although
it appears that Mr. Hunter bought most
frequently when they went out. [R. 380 L1921] Mr. Hunter did eat meals free at Ms.
Pendleton's house when she did fix meals.
[R. 357 L18-19; R. 358 L23-25; R. 364 L15-17]
7.
Mr. Hunter had, on occasion, his
clothes at the house of Ms. Pendleton and
occasionally he had a briefcase there. [R.
363 L3-11; R. 367 L16-20; R. 376 Ll-5]
8.
Ms. Pendleton did some token
laundry for Mr. Hunter [R. 361 L22 - R. 3 62
L23], and carried some of his dry cleaning to
the cleaning establishment next door. Mr.
Hunter reimbursed Mr. Pendleton for the dry
cleaning that she had had done on his behalf.
[R. 374 L20 - R. 375 L5; R. 380 L22 - R. 381
L23]
9.
Mr. Hunter shaved, showered, and
prepared himself for the day at her residence
after having spent the night with Ms.
Pendleton. [R. 396 L18 - R. 397 L5]
10. It appears that Mr. Hunter rented
an apartment approximately one (1) day prior
to the filing of Defendant's petition;
however, Mr. Hunter's wife and children were
living in the Magna area. Some of his
belongings were in that home, some of his
things were in his vehicle, and some items
were at Joyce Pendleton's. [R. 303 L6-13; R.
305 L21-24; R. 312 L23 - R. 313 L7]
11. Mr. Hunter did not use Ms.
Pendleton's residence as a mailing address.
[R. 373 L17-18; R. 338 L7-8] Mr. Hunter and
Ms. Pendleton did not share any assets or any
financial arrangements of any kind except to
the extent that there was a nominal sharing
6

of a vehicle for transportation purposes.
[R. 365 L7-18; R. 376 L6-23]
12. Mr. Hunter and Ms. Pendleton did
travel on several overnight trips and there
was some sharing of expenses during these
trips. [R. 359 L23 - R. 360 L13; R. 382 L12
- R. 383 L4]
13. The evidence is clear and
unmistakable that Mr. Hunter made no
significant or casual contribution to Ms.
Pendleton for any household expenses. [R.
364 L18-20; R. 374 L9-11; R. 378 L17-19; R.
405 L22 - R. 406 L9] He made no mortgage
payments or utility payments, and there was
no commitment to do so. [R. 373 L19-21]
(R. 283-84)(supporting citations to the record added).
As of January 27, 1995, Appellee and Hunter had only
seen each other 10-12 days within the last three months.

Hunter

testified that he had been in town more than that "taking care of
other things," but he has business in town that he takes care of
and then he has to leave.

(R. 400 L14-19).

In addition, from

August 1994 to October 1994, Hunter was residing with his wife
and dependent children in Montana.
403 L4-9).

(R. 371 L9 - R. 372 L10; R.

From November 1994 to the time of trial in January of

1995, Hunter spent less than five nights a month at Appellee's
home.

(R. 372 L23 - R. 373 L27)
Although Appellee and Hunter had discussed getting

married, they never set any dates.

(R. 403 Ll-4; R. 339 L23-25).

Hunter testified that they were not ready to commit because he
had not settled things with his current wife.

(R. 312 L2-5).

The trial court found: Janet Hunter, Hunter's wife, lives in
Montana with their dependent children; Hunter maintains a marital
7

relationship with Janet; and Hunter was not divorced from his
wife, nor had he filed for divorce,

(R. 283, Findings of Fact 5

14; R. 378 L9-16)•
Admittedly, Hunter had a key to Appellee's residence,
which did give him access to her home, but he did not obtain this
key until some time after the relationship began, and only after
"some serious problems with [Appellee's] son and a lot of
threats,11

(R. 358 L6-19; R. 386 L4-8) .

These problems included

a physical confrontation which involved Appellee's son's use of
drugs.

(R. 327 L23-24) .

Moreover, Hunter testified that, when

he was in town, he would go over to Appellee's house three to
four times a day so that he could check on the house.
L10-13).

(R. 386

Things were being stolen from the house every day.

(R.

388 L22-23; R. 406 L25 - R. 408 L3). Hunter testified that he
would not just go over to relax, or take a nap, when Appellee was
not there.

(R. 318 L25 - R. 319 L14). Furthermore, Appellee had

a key to Hunter's apartment in case she needed a place to go if
she had any problems with her son.

(R. 387 L15-19).

Appellee had a key to Hunter's Oldsmobile that was
stored at her house from July 1994 to December 1994, which she
drove when she was sick and unable to walk the two blocks to
work.

(R. 376 L6-23; R. 369 L7-8; R. 376 L6 - R. 377 L 7 ) .
Hunter testified that he spent at least 1-2 hours a day

at his own apartment, which, considering his work in real estate
and average daily travel of a hundred miles, was a considerable
8

amount of time to spend at that location.

(R. 312 L13-21; R. 395

L15 - 396 Lll). Hunter accompanied Appellee to a couple
gatherings of her family, and family members were aware that they
had a "serious relationship."

(R. 340 L3-12; R. 314 L20 - R. 315

L2) .
Hunter never moved any furniture into Appellee's home,
or bought any furniture for her.

(R. 375 L6-11).

In fact, at

the time of trial, Hunter had no clothes or other personal
property at Appellee's home.

(R. 375 Lll-16).

In addition, Hunter did not assist in any way with the
cost of maintaining Appellee's home, nor did he perform any
regular household duties in order to help maintain Appellee's
home (with the exception of repairing a toilet that he broke
himself).

(R. 406 L5-19).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellee and Hunter did not "reside" together within

the meaning of Utah's termination of alimony statute.

Although

their relationship was admittedly more than that of casual
friends, Appellee and Hunter did not enter into a relationship
consistent with marriage.

Sexual contact alone, even over an

extended period of time, is insufficient to establish the
residency required under the statute.

The facts supporting non-

residency in this case include, but are not limited to: Hunter's
maintenance of a separate residence; his marriage to another
9

individual; and perhaps most importantly, the utter lack of any
financial interdependence consistent with the traditional
marriage relationship.
Utah Supreme Court precedent supports the trial court's
conclusion that Hunter was not residing with Appellee.

In

addition, appellate decisions from other jurisdictions also
support the trial court's decision not to terminate alimony.

The

appellate decisions Appellant relies on are readily
distinguishable from the instant case.
Appellee's association with Hunter is the type of
relationship the legislature contemplated would fall outside the
termination of alimony statute.

Utah's legislators envisioned

the statute operating to terminate alimony when the receiving
spouse was living with another individual under conditions
consistent with marriage.

They expressed concern that the

statute not operate so as to terminate alimony based solely on
post-marital sexual involvement with another.

The statute was

designed to allow for the termination of alimony when the
receiving spouse entered into a continuous residency
relationship, with accompanying financial interdependence.
Finally, pursuant to established rule, statute, and
case law precedent, Appellee should be awarded her costs and
reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal.

The costs of

defending this matter below, and now on appeal, have greatly
increased Appellee's need for financial assistance.
10

The trial

court's decision should be affirmed, and the case remanded on the
narrow issue of determining the amount of Appellee's costs and
attorney fees incurred on appeal.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO
TERMINATE ALIMONY.

Based on the "residency" requirement of Utah Code
Annotated Section 30-3-5(6), and the "cohabitation" clause of the
Decree of Divorce, the trial court properly refused to terminate
alimony.

Paragraph 13 of the Decree of Divorce orders Appellant

to pay Appellee alimony "until the death of the Plaintiff, the
remarriage of the Plaintiff, cohabitation of the Plaintiff, or
further order of this court."

R. 176-77 (emphasis added).

In

addition, Section 30-3-5(6) (1989) of Utah Code Annotated states:
Any order of the court that a party pay
alimony to a former spouse terminates upon
establishment by the party paying alimony
that the former spouse is residing with a
person of the opposite sex. However, if it is
further established by the person receiving
alimony that that relationship or association
is without any sexual contact, payment of
alimony shall resume.
(Emphasis added).1

Appellee admits that her relationship with

!

This is the version of the termination of
that was in force at all relevant times below.
version, which became effective May 1, 1995, is
Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9)(Supp. 1995) and states as

alimony statute
The current
found at Utah
follows:

Any order of the court that a party pay
alimony to a former spouse terminates upon
establishment by the party paying alimony
11

Hunter included sexual contact, therefore the only issue on
appeal is whether the "residency" requirement of the statute was
satisfied.
As discussed in each of the following subsections: (A)
"Cohabitation" and "residency" both require an element of
continuity and shared financial responsibilities; (B) Appellant
has failed to establish that Appellee was "residing" with a
person of the opposite sex; (C) Appellate decisions from other
jurisdictions support a holding of non-residency in this case;
and (D) the appellate decisions Appellant relies on are readily
distinguishable from the instant case.

Accordingly, the trial

court properly dismissed Appellant's Petition for Termination of
Alimony because he failed to establish that Appellee "resid[ed"|
with a person of the opposite sex."
A.

"Cohabitation" and "Residency11 Both Require an
Element of Continuity and Shared Financial
Responsibilities.

"Cohabitation" in the Decree of divorce is not a
defined term.

Construing the term "cohabitation" in a decree of

divorce, the Utah Supreme Court in Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d
that the former spouse is cohabitating with
another person.
(Emphasis added). Representative Haymond, sponsor of House Bill
36 which amended the statute, admitted "[t]he Bill does nothing
to try to define [cohabitation]." 51st Legislature, Utah House
of Representatives, Floor Debate, Tape No. 1, January 23, 1995,
morning session. See also infra at 32-33 (discussing legislative
history of this amendment).
12

669, 671 (Utah 1985) recognized, as did the trial court in that
case, that the term "does not lend itself to a universal
definition that is applicable in all settings."

The Haddow court

recognized the definition adopted by a majority of cases and
statutes which follow the dictionary definition: "To live
together as husband and wife."

Id. (citing Black's Law

Dictionary 236 (5th ed. 1979)2; Webster's Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary 257 (1984)).3

See also, Lynn D. Wardle et al.,

2

The current edition of Black's Law Dictionary defines
"cohabitation" as follows:
To live together as husband and wife. The
mutual assumption of those marital rights,
duties and obligations which are usually
manifested by married people, including but
not necessarily dependent on sexual
relations.
Black's Law Dictionary 260 (6th ed. 1990)(emphasis
added)(citations omitted).
3

Utah's Cohabitant Abuse Act defines the term "cohabitant"
as follows:
[A]n emancipated person pursuant to Section
15-2-1 or a person who is 16 years of age or
older who:
(a) is or was a spouse of the other
party;
(b) is or was living as if a spouse of
the other party:
(c) is related by blood or marriage to
the other party;
(d) has one or more children in common
with the other party; or
(e) resides or has resided in the same
residence as the other party.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-1(2)(Supp. 1995)(emphasis added). This
definition of "cohabitant" includes elements of de facto marriage
13

Contemporary Family Law: Principles, Policy and Practice § 32:11
at 57 (Vol. 3, 1988)("Cohabitation is defined variously, but
generally means living together xon a resident, continuing and
conjugal basis.'")(footnote omitted).
In Haddow, the court held that there were two key
elements to the term "cohabitation": "common residency and sexual
contact evidencing a conjugal association."

Id. at 672 (adopting

within the term "cohabitation" the requirement of
"residency")(emphasis added).4

The Court went on to state that

"common residency means the sharing of a common abode that both
parties consider their principal domicile for more than a
temporary or brief period of time."

Id.

"Cohabitation is not a

sojourn, nor a habit of visiting, nor even remaining with for a
time; the term implies continuity."
Burke, 340 P.2d 948, 950 (Or. 1959)).

Id. at 673 (quoting Burke v.
The court in Haddow also

stated that the residency clause of the termination of alimony
statute was drafted for the same purpose as the cohabitation
clause in the decree of divorce.

Id.

and residency.
4

Appellant incorrectly asserts: "The continuing sexual
aspect o[f] this relationship satisfies the requirement of
Cohabitation7 as set forth in the Decree of Divorce."
Appellants Brief at 10. Appellant's assertion completely
ignores the elements of "common residency" and "mutual assumption
of marital rights, duties and obligations usually manifested by
married people" which are implicit in the term "cohabitation."
14

"Residency" is not a defined term in the termination of
alimony statute, however, the Utah Supreme Court has defined the
word "residing" as used in the statute as: "To dwell permanently
or for a length of time; to have a settled abode for a time."
Knuteson v. Knuteson, 619 P.2d 1387, 1389 (Utah 1980)(quoting
Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, 2nd. Edition).
Both "cohabitation" and "residency" require permanency
or continuity.

Therefore, the application of either of these

definitions to the facts of this case would be essentially
identical.5

Appellant admitted at the trial court that for

purposes of this case, "residing . . . is equivalent to
cohabitation . . . ." R. 350 L24-25.6 Accordingly, it is
appropriate to focus on the statutory requirement of "residency."
B.

Appellant has Failed to Establish that Appellee
was "Residing" with a Person of the Opposite Sex,

As set forth above, the Knuteson court defined the word
"residing" as used in the statute as: "To dwell permanently or
for a length of time; to have a settled abode for a time."
5

Judge Rigtrup concluded that the termination of alimony
statute was controlling in this case, and did not address the
"cohabitation" provision in the Decree of divorce. (R. 284,
Conclusions of Law fl 1). Judge Rigtrup also stated that
"residency contemplates some duration, some continuity, some
commitment to a shared beneficial relationship. (R. 449 L14-16).
Appellant's unsupported first-time argument on appeal, that
proof of "residence" is less precise than that of "cohabitation"
is not only incorrect, but is inconsistent with his own admission
below.
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Knuteson v. Knuteson, 619 P.2d 1387, 1389 (Utah 1980)(quoting
Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, 2nd,
Edition)(emphasis added).

Under this definition, Hunter never

resided with Appellee.
The Utah Supreme Court in Knuteson, affirmed Third
District Judge Christine M. Durham's decision not to terminate
the recipient spouse's alimony based on the termination of
alimony statute.

In Knuteson, the recipient spouse moved in with

a neighbor for roughly two months and ten days, at least in part
because of the grim financial situation brought about by her exhusband's non-payment of alimony.

Although she candidly

confessed to having sexual relations with the neighbor, Mr.
Conder, the reviewing court refused to terminate her right to
receive alimony because "the wording of the statute does not
appear to cover a temporary stay at another's home."
1389.

Id. at

Although admittedly somewhat distinguishable on its facts,

the Knuteson decision supports the trial court's decision in this
case.

Like the temporary stay of the recipient spouse in

Knuteson with her neighbor, Hunter's overnight visits were
temporary and short term.

There was clearly never any effort to

make Appellee's home his permanent dwelling or settled abode.

He

never kept any belongings there, except occasionally a few
articles of clothing and a briefcase.

He maintained a separate

residence, and never received any mail at Appellee's home.

These

facts, as well as those discussed below in the context of the
16

Haddow decision, demonstrate that Appellee and Hunter never
resided together within the meaning of the termination of alimony
statute.
The Haddow decision, nearly identical on its facts, is
a powerful precedent for this case.

In Haddow, the Utah Supreme

Court reversed the trial court's order that the ex-wife pay her
former husband one-half of the equity in the home in which she
was living pursuant to an equitable lien established in the
divorce decree.

The reviewing court held that the trial court

had improperly construed the "cohabitation" language in the
decree.

Haddow, 707 P.2d at 670. The trial court found that the

spouse spent most of her free time with her boyfriend, Mr.
Hudson.

Mr. Hudson had dinner at the spouse's house five or six

times a week, and spent the night with her approximately once a
week.

Mr. Hudson would leave clothes at her home, which she

would launder, and sometimes take to the dry cleaner.

He would

sometimes shower and change at her home.

Mr. Hudson maintained a

separate residence at his parent's home.

He did use her home as

a mailing address for a couple of bank accounts.

There was no

evidence that they shared any assets or had any joint financial
accounts, projects, or liabilities.

Mr. Hudson gave the spouse

money to reimburse her for the food he ate, and took her car to
be serviced at a car dealership where he worked.

"Beyond that,

Mr. Hudson made no financial or tangible contributions to
appellant or to her household, nor did he share living expenses
17

with her in any sense."

Id. at 67 0-71.

The court found it

significant that Mr. Hudson did not pay any of the receiving
spouse's living expenses, or consistently share her assets. He
did not contribute to the mortgage payment, the insurance on the
house, or the utility bills.
Id. at 673-74.

They rarely shared automobiles.

The court recognized Mr. Hudson's reimbursements

for food and dry cleaning as evidence of their intent that each
bear their own expenses.

Id. at 674.

In addition, the court was

not critical of the fact that Mr. Hudson left a van parked at the
receiving spouse's home for several months for storage purposes,
rather than for the convenience of daily use.

Mr. Hudson and the

spouse had been dating each other exclusively for about fourteen
months.

They also took trips together to Hawaii and Elko,

Nevada.

Id. at 672.
The facts of this case are nearly identical to those in

Haddow.

Like the receiving spouse and her boyfriend in Haddow,

Appellee and Hunter spent much of their free time together, if
Hunter was in town.

Hunter would sometimes eat a meal at

Appellee's home, and would spend the night at her home.

Hunter

would occasionally leave clothes and a briefcase at Appellee's
home.

Appellee did some token laundry for Hunter, and carried

some of his laundry to the dry cleaner, for which she was later
reimbursed by Hunter.
at Appellee's home.

Hunter would sometimes shower and change

Unlike the boyfriend in Haddow, Hunter did

not use Appellee's address to receive any of his mail, thus
18

making the case for non-residency even stronger here than in
Haddow.

In addition, the evidence is "clear and unmistakable"

that Hunter and Appellee shared no financial obligations or
expenses.

R. 283.

Hunter did not contribute toward the mortgage

or utility payments.

Like the boyfriend in Haddow, Hunter left a

vehicle stored at Appellee's home for storage purposes, which
Appellee used only on those occasions when she was sick and
unable to walk the two blocks to work.

This vehicle was clearly

not intended for Appellee's daily use.

Appellee and Hunter also

took some short weekend trips together.

As further indicia of

his non-residence with Appellee, Hunter testified that he did not
assist in any way with the cost of maintaining Appellee's home,
nor did he perform any regular household duties in order to help
maintain Appellee's home (with the exception of repairing a
toilet that he broke himself).

R. 406 L5-19.

Based on these facts, the Haddow decision strongly
supports the trial court's finding that Appellant failed to
establish that Appellee was residing with Hunter.

Obviously

neither Appellee nor Hunter considered Appellee's home his
principal residence, nor did his visits to the home rise to the
level of continuity required under the statute.
That Appellee and Hunter engaged in a fairly consistent
pattern of sexual relations is not disputed.
of Fact f 4; R. 401 L3-5).
constitute "residency."

(R. 282, Findings

Nevertheless, sex alone does not

See Haddow, 707 P.2d at 672-73 ("sexual
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contact, even if extensive, does not alone constitute
cohabitation"); Knight v, Knight, 500 So. 2d 1113, 1116 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1986)("regular social and sexual companions is
insufficient to prove cohabitation").

Appellant's emphasis on

the duration of the sexual relationship is therefore misplaced.
See Appellant's Brief at 16.

Furthermore, the morality of their

conduct is not at issue.7 The statute does not call for the
termination of alimony solely upon proof that the recipient
spouse has engaged in sexual relations, but rather requires a
commitment to a shared relationship established by residency.
The legislature certainly intended to strike a balance between
the occasional sexual sojourn and common law marriage.

See infra

Argument II at 30-34 (discussing legislative history of
termination of alimony statute).
Appellant places much emphasis on Hunter's possession
of a key to Appellee's home, which allegedly conferred upon him
free access to the home, even when Appellee was not there.
Admittedly, the Haddow court considered non-possession of a key

7

In amending the termination of alimony statute, legislators
stated:
It is not the intent of the Legislature that
termination of alimony based on cohabitation
with another person in accordance with
Subsection 30-3-5(9), be interpreted in any
way to condone such a relationship for any
purpose.
Utah Legislative Report 1995 at 36 ("legislative intent").
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in that case as evidence supporting non-residency.

Id. at 673.

In this case, however, Hunter was given a key so that he could,
as a favor to Appellee, help check on the house because of the
problems Appellee was having with her drug-abusing son.

Hunter

testified that he did not use the key, when Appellee was not
there, to "pop a cool one", take a nap, or just relax.

R. 318

L25 - R. 319 L14. Hunter's possession of a key was to help him
keep Appellee's home and its contents secure, and was not
intended to grant him the access of a cohabitant.
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Wacker v. Wacker,
668 P.2d 533 (Utah 1983) (per curiam), is also very persuasive.
In Wacker, the trial court's refusal to terminate alimony
pursuant to the statute was reversed on appeal.

In that case,

the recipient spouse lived with her boyfriend for approximately
three years in a shared financial relationship that included
sexual contact.

There was evidence that the receiving spouse

shared the rent, utility, and grocery bills.

Id. at 534. The

reviewing court held that the residency requirement of the
statute had been satisfied under these circumstances, and alimony
should therefore be terminated.

The facts in the instant case

obviously weigh in favor of the opposite result.

The period of

Appellee and Hunter's most significant contact is eight months,
during which time, and all other times, they did not share any
meaningful financial responsibilities or obligations.
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Other

appellate courts that have examined similar cases have come to
the same conclusion.
C.

Appellate Decisions From Other Jurisdictions
Support a Holding of Non-Residency in this Case,

Numerous other jurisdictions have addressed the issue
on appeal in this case, and support the conclusion that Hunter
never resided with Appellee.
Alabama has a statute, similar to Utah's, which
provides for the termination of alimony "upon petition of a party
to the decree and proof that the spouse receiving such alimony
has remarried or that such spouse is living openly or cohabiting
with a member of the opposite sex."

Jones v. Jones, 387 So. 2d

217, 218 (Ala. Civ. App.), cert, denied. Ex parte Jones, 387 So.
2d 219 (Ala. 1980)(quoting Ala. Code § 30-2-55, 1975).8
In Jones, the reviewing court affirmed the trial
court's refusal to terminate alimony based on cohabitation.
at 219.

Id.

The receiving spouse and her boyfriend had been dating

and taking trips together over a period of five years.

They

engaged in sexual relations, and the boyfriend spent the night at
the spouse's home on many occasions.

They sometimes went to

restaurants and bars together, and he would drive her car.
occasionally performed maintenance on the home.
8

He

He did not have

Appellee's research reveals that Alabama has rendered the
majority of appellate decisions dealing with the termination of
alimony based on cohabitation.
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a wardrobe, nor did he receive his mail at the spouse's home.

He

did not make any contribution towards the spouse's household
expenses or groceries.

Id. at 218.

Based on these facts, the

Jones court refused to reverse the trial court's decision that
the former husband failed to meet his burden of proof that his
ex-wife was cohabiting with a member of the opposite sex.

Id.9

The facts of this case are similar, most notably, the
lack of any shared financial relationship.
holding of no-residency in this case.

Jones supports a

Unlike the boyfriend in

Jones, Hunter testified that he did not assist in any way with
the cost of maintaining Appellee's home, nor did he perform any
regular household duties in order to help maintain Appellee's
home (with the exception of repairing a toilet that he broke
himself).

(R. 406 L5-19).

The facts of this case are therefore

actually even stronger than those in Jones.
More recent Alabama appellate cases have affirmed the
trial courts' decisions not to terminate alimony.

For example,

in Ayers v. Ayers, 643 So.2d 1375, 1376 (Ala. Civ. App.) cert,
denied. Ex parte Ayers, 643 So. 2d 1377 (Ala. 1994), the court
9

The Alabama cases have unanimously adopted the abuse of
discretion standard of review on the issue of cohabitation. The
appellate court will not substitute its judgment for that of the
trial court on the issue of cohabitation "unless [it] was clearly
and palpably wrong." Jones, 387 So.2d at 218; see also Avers v.
Ayers, 643 So. 2d 1375, 1377 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994)(question of
cohabitation question of fact determined by trial court and will
be upheld unless based upon all of the evidence and reasonable
inferences, it is plainly and palpably wrong); Knight v. Knight,
500 So. 2d 1113, 1115 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986)(same).
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affirmed the decision below that the husband had not sufficiently
proved cohabitation.

The court employed the long-standing

definition of cohabitation that had been developed under Alabama
case law: "some permanency of relationship coupled with more than
occasional sexual activity between the cohabitants,"
1377.

Id. at

"Factors suggesting permanency of relationship include

occupation of the same dwelling and the sharing of household
expenses."

Id.

In Ayers, the court upheld, with little

discussion, the trial court's conclusion that "all of the
evidence as to the relationship between the [wife] and [the
alleged cohabitant] gave the Court a brief snapshot of a threeyear romantic friendship between them but did not meet the burden
of proof sufficient to establish cohabitation as a matter of
law."

Ayers, 643 So. 2d at 1377.

Appellee and Hunter's

relationship was similar to a close romantic friendship.

Simply

put, they did not live together as husband and wife.
The facts in the Alabama case of Knight v. Knight, 500
So. 2d 1113 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986) are also similar to those in
the instant case.

In Knight, the court found that Mrs. Knight

and her boyfriend, Mr. Cole, maintained separate residences.
Neither contributed anything toward the other's debts, expenses
or support.

There was no evidence that they used each other's

homes for mail, or any other purpose.
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They were regular social

companions and sexual lovers who intended to marry.10
1116.

Id. at

Based on these facts, the reviewing court reversed the

trial court's termination of alimony, holding that there was no
cohabitation.

Id.

Like the individuals in Knight, Appellee and

Hunter maintained separate residences, did not contribute to one
another's financial obligations, did not receive mail at each
other's homes, and even discussed possible marriage, although no
definite plans were ever made.

Based on these facts, it is clear

that Appellee and Hunter were not living together as husband and
wife, and were therefore not "residing" together as contemplated
by the termination of alimony statute.
Other Alabama cases have held that the evidence was
insufficient to prove cohabitation.

See, e.g., Snipes v. Snipes,

651 So. 2d 19, 21 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994)(trial court's refusal to
terminate alimony affirmed); Wilcoxson v. Wilcoxson, 498 So. 2d
1238 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986)(trial court's refusal to terminate
alimony affirmed; talked about marriage but no definite plans;
stored furniture at his house; saw each other quite frequently
and occasional sexual intercourse);

l0

Hicks v. Hicks, 405 So. 2d

The court also noted "[t]here is no evidence that either of
them kept any clothing or other personal effects in the other's
home, or that either had a key to the other's house." Id. at
1116. Admittedly, there is evidence of these facts existing in
this case, however, the clothing kept in Appellee's home was
negligible, and Hunter's possession of a key was to allow him, as
a favor, to watch over the home and its contents, rather than to
grant him the free and unlimited access of a resident or
cohabitant.
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31, 33 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981)(trial court's termination of alimony
reversed; evidence insufficient to support cohabitation; dated
for two to three times per week for about a year but no evidence
shared a common dwelling; no factors indicating permanency of
relationship).
In addition, other states have held, under similar
circumstances, that alimony to the receiving spouse should not be
terminated.

See, e.g., Daniels v. Daniels, 374 S.E.2d 735 (Ga.

1989)(trial court's termination of alimony pursuant to "live-in
lover" statute reversed; evidence supported finding of periodic
sexual encounters, but insufficient to show dwelled together
continuously or openly); Reiter v. Reiter, 365 S.E.2d 826 (Ga.
1988)(cohabitation necessary to modify alimony under "live-in
lover" statute, "must go beyond periodic, physical interludes");
Matter of Marriage of Wessling, 747 P.2d 187 (Kan. App.
1987)(trial court's refusal to terminate alimony pursuant to
"cohabitation" clause in divorce settlement affirmed; kept
separate residences; shared no living expenses; no jointly owned
property); Miller v. Miller, 508 A.2d 550 (Pa. Super. 1986)(trial
court's refusal to terminate alimony pursuant to "cohabitation"
statute affirmed; maintained separate residences; not share
incomes or expenses); see also Annotation, Divorced Woman's
Subsequent Sexual Relations or misconduct as Warranting, Alone or
With Other Circumstances, Modification of Alimony Decree, 98
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A.L.R.3d 453 (1980)(discussing numerous cases dealing with
modification of alimony based on cohabitation).
In re Marriage of Gibson, 320 N.W.2d 822 (Iowa 1982),
also considered the alleged cohabitants possession of a key to
the receiving spouse's home.

In Gibson, the trial court's

decision to terminate alimony was reversed.

Id. at 824.

The

receiving spouse had a boyfriend who stayed in the residence at
least four times a week, and he often ate there.

He would enjoy

the use of the utilities and would occasionally bring clothes to
the home.

He maintained another residence where he kept his

clothing and furniture, received his mail, and maintained his own
telephone.

Id. at 82 3.

On these facts, the court held as

follows:
The time ("the recipient spouse's]
boyfriend spent in the dwelling was
extensive, easily sufficient to qualify as
residence if time alone controlled. But the
time was not spent as a resident. He
maintained a separate residence and shared
none of the expenses of this one. He did not
even have a key or the freedom to enter it
except when petitioner was present. In
simple terms he did not live there. The
trial court erred in finding [the recipient
spouse] cohabited with a nonrelated male
under the dissolution decree.
Id. at 824.

The facts of Gibson are very similar to this one,

even though Hunter at some point acquired a key to Appellee's
home. As previously discussed, his acquisition of a key was not
intended to provide him with the unlimited access of a coresident.

Furthermore, there is no question that, particularly
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during their eight-month relationship, Hunter and Appellee spent
a substantial amount of time together.

As the Gibson court

pointed out, however, time alone, even if extensive, is
insufficient to establish residency.

Residency under the statute

surely contemplates more than the mere occupation of space over
time.
Like the boyfriend in Gibson, Hunter maintained a
separate residence, where he received his mail, kept his clothes
and other personal belongings, and maintained a telephone.

Most

importantly, he never shared in the expenses of maintaining
Appellee7s home.

In fact, he would even reimburse Appellee for

his dry cleaning, on those occasions that she paid for it, thus,
evidencing an intent to keep their financial responsibilities
separate.

On these facts, the trial court properly refused to

terminate alimony.
D.

The Appellate Decisions Appellant Relies on are
Readily Distinguishable from the Instant Case.

Appellant has cited a number of cases in support of his
position, including several cases from Alabama.

Appellant fails

to point out, however, that the standard of appellate review in
Alabama is the clearly erroneous standard.

See supra n.9.

of these cases is therefore easily distinguishable.

Each

For

instance, the underlying facts in McCluskey v. McCluskey, 528 So.
2d 328 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988) are quite similar to this case, as
discussed on pages 21-24 of Appellant's Brief.
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The McCluskey

court specifically recognized, however, that n[w]hile the trial
court, in its discretion, could have reached a contrary decision
under the evidence, we find no abuse of discretion."
(emphasis added).

Id. at 331

In addition, the clear trend of the more

recent cases in Alabama, is to hold that the evidence was
insufficient to establish cohabitation, particularly when there
was no evidence of sharing household expenses.

See, e.g., Ayers,

So. 2d at 1377; Snipes, 651 So. 2d at 21.
The other cases cited by Appellant are also
distinguishable on their facts, and actually, in this case, weigh
in favor of continued alimony for failure to establish residency.
See Daniels v. Daniels, 599 So. 2d 1208 (Ala. Civ. App.
1992)(trial court decision terminating alimony affirmed; ex-wife
moved in with boyfriend; parties lived together seven years;
shared utility payments; traded housework for rent payments; car
in both names); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 598 So. 2d 985 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1992)(trial court's decision terminating alimony affirmed;
parties lived together five years; shared responsibilities and
expenses); Taylor v. Taylor, 550 So. 2d 996 (Ala. Civ. App.
1989)(trial court's decision terminating alimony affirmed; moved
his clothes into wife's house; received house key; paid utility
bills, mortgage notes, and legal fees; contributed to household
expenses and maintenance); In re Marriage of Frasco, 638 N.E.2d
655 (111. App. 1994)(trial court's refusal to terminate alimony
reversed; was traditional model of marriage; live together not
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enough, need de facto husband and wife relationship; divided
household responsibilities; took all meals together; created
joint checking account, and commingled funds; put boyfriend's
name on certificate of deposit); In re Marriage of Harvey, 466
N.W.2d 916 (Iowa 1991)(trial court's termination of alimony
affirmed; spent three to four nights a week together; sublet
other apartment and told landlord giving it up; kept substantial
part of clothes at wife's home; performed household duties;
performed duties of a father to wife's children; kept two
motorcycles and car at wife's home; free and unlimited access to
wife's home; in short, boyfriend lived at wife's home).
II.

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OP UTAH'S
TERMINATION OP ALIMONY STATUTE SUPPORTS
A FINDING OF NON-RESIDENCY IN THIS CASE.

Appellant erroneously relies on legislative history to
support his position.

As Appellant has alleged, Representative

Pace, the sponsor of House Bill 188, stated during the debate in
the Utah State House of Representatives, that the purpose of the
new law was to establish a public policy that if a couple decides
to "share the bed," then they must "share the board."

43rd

Legislature, Utah House of Representatives, Floor Debate, Disc.
No. 5, February 26, 1979; see also Appellant's Brief at 17.

The

legislature went on to acknowledge, however, as Appellant admits,
that the purpose of the statute is "to allow courts to grant
supporting spouses relief from alimony when the receiving spouse
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choose to live with a person of the opposite sex xunder
conditions consistent with marriage.'"

Appellant's Brief at 17-

18 (quoting 43rd Legislature, Utah House of Representatives,
Floor Debate, Disc. No. 5, February 26, 1979,u morning session).
By "sharing the bed," legislators obviously contemplated the
parties engaging in more than just sexual relations, but rather
envisioned the sharing of possessions and responsibilities "under
conditions consistent with marriage."
This distinction was raised by Representative Rowe:
This Bill has, in my opinion, a
diametrically opposed purpose. We have
alimony on one hand which is designed for the
support of the spouse after or during
separation and after divorce, and then we
have living-in arrangement, on the other
hand, related primarily to sex and sexual
exchanges. I don't really see where the two
really come together.
But in the case of alimony, if a young
woman or a man takes up a living-in
arrangement with another person of the
opposite sex, then that arrangement may be or
may not be related to the financial support
of that individual and alimony is to provide
that support. If we attach alimony to an
overnight stand or one afternoon or a weeklong episode or whatever, we may still not be
providing the necessary support for that
individual to have, to provide the basic
living requirements of food, shelter,
clothing, etc.
We are very likely to put someone out on
the street . . . without any support at all
thereby becoming wards of the state and
having to be supported by the state through
n

Appellant cites the date as 1989., however, this is clearly
a typographical error since House Bill 188 was actually debated,
adopted, and became law in 1979.
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our tax bills. I don't think this is
intended either. I think alimony is for
support and we have to protect it.
43rd Legislature, Utah House of Representatives, Floor Debate,
Disc No. 6, February 26, 1979, morning session (emphasis added).
Representative Rowe's statement emphasizes the legislature's
concern that the statute not be used to terminate alimony based
solely on the receiving spouse's post-marital sexual relationship
with another.

Legislators clearly envisioned the termination of

alimony taking place upon a showing that the receiving spouse had
entered into a shared financial relationship consistent with
marriage.
Senator Jeffs also stated as follows with respect to
the residency requirement:
This statute not only implements present
law, namely that upon remarriage alimony
stops, but also has a provision that in the
event the spouse who is collecting alimony
assumes residing, permanent residency, with
another person as if they were their spouse,
it [alimony] will terminate, even if they
don't marry them.
4 3rd Legislature, Utah Senate, Floor Debate, Disc. No. 3 06, March
6, 1979, general session.

Obviously, "as if they were their

spouse" envisions more than just a sexual relationship, but
includes continuous residency coupled with financial
interdependence.
There is also some useful information found in the
legislative history of the 1995 amendment of the termination of
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alimony statute which changed the language from "residing" to
"cohabitating"•

See supra, n.l.

Senator Hillyard mentioned that

the basis for changing the statute to require "cohabitating"
instead of "residing" was to bring the language of the statute in
line with the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Haddow.

51st

Legislature, Utah Senate, Floor Debate, Tape No. 26, February 16,
1995, general session.

This renders Haddow an even more

persuasive precedent for non-residency in this case.
Furthermore, Representative Howard, in response to a
question regarding the general intent behind the 1995 amendment,
stated as follows:
If someone really is cohabiting, they
are living with another person in that
companionship relationship that is at least
commensurate with marriage, then alimony
ought to stop.
If they are in a substitute marriage
relationship, alimony ought to end.
51st Legislature, Utah House of Representatives, Floor Debate,
Tape No. 1, January 23, 1995, morning session.
The foregoing legislative history demonstrates that
lawmakers did not intend to terminate alimony based solely on a
receiving spouse's sexual involvement with another following
marriage.

Legislators contemplated continuous, permanent

residency, including shared financial responsibilities.

Appellee

and Hunter's actions were not consistent with marriage, therefore
there was no attempt to circumvent the statute by entering into a
de facto marriage.

In short, legislative history supports the
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trial court's conclusion that Appellant failed to establish the
residency required under the statute.
III. APPELLEE SHOULD BE AWARDED HER COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL.
Appellee is without financial resources to meet her
legal expenses.

Moreover, Appellee's financial situation has

deteriorated further due to the trial below and this appeal, and
is therefore in need of financial assistance.

Rule 34(a) of the

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (1995) states in relevant part:
"if a judgment or order is affirmed, costs shall be taxed against
appellant unless otherwise ordered."

Accordingly, if this Court

affirms the decision of the trial court, Appellee should be
awarded her costs incurred on appeal.
In addition, Appellee should be awarded her reasonable
attorneys7 fees incurred on appeal.12

Utah Code Annotated

Section 30-3-3(1) (1995) allows a court to award costs and
reasonable attorney fees incurred in defending an action relating
to the payment of alimony.

Pursuant to Section 30-3-3(1), this

Court may order Appellant to pay costs and attorney fees incurred
on appeal.

Bagshaw v. Bacrshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 1061-62 (Utah App.

1990); Mauahan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 162 (Utah App. 1989).

12

Although Appellee claimed reimbursement of her costs to
defend this action below (R. 247) , the trial court ordered that
each party in this case would bear their own costs and attorney
fees through trial. (R. 285). This ruling is not contested by
either party on appeal.
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In an appeal of the trial court's refusal to terminate
alimony, the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows:
[Appellee] argues that inasmuch as the
[appellant] was unwilling to abide by the
trial court's judgment, and that she has been
put to the necessity of defending this
appeal, the [appellant] should have to bear
the costs thereof, including reasonable
attorney's fees for her counsel. We agree
with the reasonableness and propriety of her
request. Therefore, the case is remanded for
the purpose of determining and awarding her
such attorney's fees as the trial court finds
to be reasonable and properly incurred on
this appeal.
Carter v. Carter. 584 P.2d 904, 906 (Utah 1978)(footnotes
omitted).
If the decision of the trial court is affirmed, this
Court should remand the case to the trial court to determine the
narrow issue of Appellee's reasonable attorney fees on appeal.
See Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 470 (Utah App. 1989)(remanding
narrow issue of attorney fees on appeal to trial court).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing points and authorities, this
Court should affirm Judge Rigtrup's refusal to terminate alimony.
Appellant has clearly failed to establish that Appellee resided
with Hunter.

Sexual relations alone, do not satisfy the

residency requirement of the termination of alimony statute.
Appellate decisions from Utah and other jurisdictions, as well as
relevant legislative history, strongly support non-residency in
35

this case.

Furthermore, this Court should award Appellee's costs

and reasonable attorney fees incurred in defending this appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

tf

day of October, 1995.

SCALLEY & READING
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